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Naturally, I have given some thought as to how I can honour Ivan Rand in this 
lecture. I feel that I can make a connection in terms of substance. I hope to link his 
well-known focus on the rule of law to my subject of drawing reasonable inferences 
in criminal trials. Style is more of a challenge. I feel in my bones that Ivan Rand 
would not have cared for a PowerPoint presentation. As well, when he wrote a paper, 
delivered a judgment or gave a lecture, he produced a knowledgeable, structured 
analysis of a particular area of law such as fraud.1 His judgments, scholarly papers, 
and lectures were not striking for digressions, frivolities, or soul-searching about 
choice of words. He did not indulge in the lengthy footnotes described by Chuck 
Zerby in his book The Devil’s Details, as the “corridor where the scholar pops out of 
his office to stretch his legs and meeting colleagues, gossips, tells jokes, rants about 
politics and society, and feels free to offer opinions based on nothing but his 
prejudices and whims.”2 Rather, Rand was a practitioner of the art of the footnote as 
brief citation.
He was not averse to bold asides, such as the sweeping assertion in his article 
on fraud that fraud was present in almost every class of sport.3 And it appears that he 
took pleasure in the collection of what might be called historical trivia, such as 
examples of “mischievous frauds” in the same article.4 He referred to the existence 
of 2,000 “Van Dykes” when only 70 were painted by that artist.5 Such observations 
or decorative illustrations were included in his text rather than his footnotes. In spite 
of my admiration for such flourishes as the 2,000 Van Dykes, I think it is fair to say 
that his sense of humour, personal opinion and interest in scholarly gossip were 
implied rather than explicit in his writing and lectures.
In contrast, my view is that the appropriate place for asides, trivia, and fooling 
around is generally the footnote. I like the relative freedom footnotes provide for
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lists, tangents, and quibbling. I like the scope for the self-indulgence of both quoting 
and taking issue with oneself and of sly digs at others. The footnote, oddly, is a 
written medium through which the author’s voice can be more clearly heard than in 
the text. In spite of the fact that it is a stretch to make the connection, I propose to try 
to honour this “implied” aspect of Rand’s scholarship by delivering this lecture in the 
form of verbal footnotes to my PowerPoint presentation.6
Let me turn then to the reference to “first rate” in my title. According to former 
Dean MacKay of the University of Western Ontario Faculty of Law, “first rate” was 
one of Ivan Rand’s favourite expressions.7 He applied it to anything special, such as 
a first rate blizzard or a first rate automobile accident. (I had some first rate 
turbulence flying here from Vancouver.) First rate fact finding in the form of 
reasonable inferences is particularly important in criminal trials, where freedom, 
reputation and the safety of the public are at stake. A concern in the critical literature 
on the law of evidence is that fact finders should carefully examine and tailor the 
inferences they may draw and not base factual findings on off-the-peg stereotypes. 
For example, sexual assault trials have attracted particular concern about 
stereotypical reasoning. There has been a good deal of feminist engagement with 
inferences in that context. In my own work, for instance, I have focused on the 
drawing of inferences of consent from prior sexual history.8
I am not going to denounce the stereotyping of women in sexual assault trials 
today. In fact, I am going to indulge in stereotyping myself and tell you a story about 
an Irishman. (My defence is that we are close to St. Patrick’s Day.) This particular 
Irishman went out drinking one night. He drank heartily. He came home with two 
small bottles of whiskey in his back pockets. As he came in his front door he fell 
backwards and broke both bottles. He pulled down his pants and, looking in the hall 
mirror, he saw many small cuts to his bottom. He stumbled around looking for Band- 
Aids, and, using the hall mirror, he applied them to all the cuts he could see. In the 
morning, his wife, a charming Irishwoman, said to him in her candid fashion:
“You got drunk again last night.”
He replied, “What makes you say that, sweetheart?”
She said, “Well, it could be the noise you made coming in the door. It 
could be this bloody, broken glass on the floor. It could be the smell of 
whiskey. But really it’s all those Band-Aids on the hall mirror.”
Justice Rand, like the Irishman’s wife, was familiar with the process of drawing 
“reasonable inferences” from evidence.
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What the jury “must do is draw their conclusions from the 
evidence submitted to them or the reasonable inferences 
arising from it.”
Chow Bew v. The Queen9
In the murder case of Chow Bew, he refers to the impropriety of a judge urging 
a jury to engage in speculation. The jury (or fact finders more generally) should only 
draw reasonable inferences.
In jury trials it is the jurors who decide whether to draw inferences. However, 
judges often try to influence the jury and not always in the direction of promoting 
first rate fact finding. In order not to cast aspersions on any of Justice Rand’s judicial 
colleagues who are present, I draw my examples from English trials.
Jeremy Thorpe was the leader of the Liberal Party in the United Kingdom from 
1967-1976. His political career ended after he was charged with incitement and 
conspiracy to murder of an alleged lover, Norman Scott. At his jury trial, the Old 
Bailey judge described Mr. Scott as follows:
You will remember him well—a hysterical, warped personality.. .He is a 
crook.. .He is a fraud. He is a sponger. He is whiner. He is a parasite. But 
of course he could still be telling the truth. It is a question of belief.. .1 am 
not expressing any opinion.10
The jury acquitted.11 This summing up was famously satirized by Peter Cook in 
an Amnesty benefit show, The Secret Policeman’s Ball, in a piece that became 
known as Entirely a Matter for You.12
A contrasting example is from a defamation case, albeit one ultimately leading 
to a conviction for peijury. British politician and writer Jeffrey Archer sued the Daily 
Star, which had published an allegation that he had paid money to a prostitute for 
sex. Justice Caulfield famously said to the jury.
Remember Mary Archer [his wife] in the witness-box? Your vision of her 
will probably never disappear. Has she elegance? Has she fragrance?
Would she have, without the strain of this trial, radiance? How would she 
appeal? Has she a happy married life? Has she been able to enjoy, rather 
than endure, her husband Jeffrey?...Is he in need of cold, unloving, rubber-
9 [1955] 2 D.L.R. (2d) 294 (S.C.C.), Rand J.
10 Auberon Waugh, The Last Word An Eye-Witness Account o f the Trial o f Jeremy Thorpe (London: 
Michael Joseph, 1980) at 223-25.
11 Don Stuart, annotation to R. v. Lawes (2006), 37 C.R. (6th) 301 (Ont. C.A.).
12 Peter Cook, Entirely a Matter for You, online: phespirit.info <http://www.phespirit.info/pictures/ 
heroes/p008_info.htm>.
insulated sex in a seedy hotel round about quarter to one after an evening 
at the Caprice?13
The jury was thus invited to draw an inference that a man with a “fragrant wife” 
would not have sex with a prostitute. The jury awarded Archer 500,000 pounds in 
damages. Jeffrey Archer was later convicted on a charge of perjury arising out of his 
testimony at the defamation trial.
The question of how to assess whether inferences that a man who stuck Band- 
Aids on a mirror was intoxicated, that a man whom a judge thinks is a scoundrel is 
lying, and that a person with a fragrant spouse would not pay for sex after a night at 
the Caprice are reasonable is the subject of my remarks this evening.
Relevance—the basic concept of the law of evidence
Inferences cannot be drawn from irrelevant evidence
• Rationality
• Fairness
• Equality
• Economy
“Circumstantial evidence serves as a basis from which the trier 
of fact may make reasonable inferences about a matter in 
issue.”14
Reasonable inferences are drawn from relevant circumstantial evidence. In 
other words, to say that evidence is irrelevant is to say that one can draw no 
reasonable inference from it. It would be irrational, unfair, inegalitarian, and 
inefficient in terms of judicial economy to base inferences on irrelevant information.
There are many examples of Canadian courts addressing issues of whether 
particular information can appropriately be used as the basis of an inference in 
criminal trials. An uncontroversial example relating to proof of mens rea is that a 
fact finder may draw an inference of intention from conduct. Here are some other 
examples demonstrating the use of the footnote as a list that would otherwise 
interrupt the flow of the text.
Generally, negative inferences cannot be drawn from the decision of an accused
13 Evan Whitton, Serial Liars: How Lawyers Get the Money and Get the Criminals O ff (Glebe, NSW: 
Lulu Press, 2005) at 25.
14 Richard O. Lempert, Samuel R. Gross & James S. Liebman, A Modem Approach to Evidence, 3d ed. 
(St. Paul: West Group, 2000) at 205-06.
not to testify. But that decision may weaken an alibi. It is not generally appropriate to 
draw an inference about consent or credibility from the sexual history of a 
complainant in a sexual assault trial. However, the fact that such a complainant has 
not written about the alleged assault in her diary may be relevant to credibility. 
Knowledge of the privilege against self-incrimination does not yield an inference in 
relation to truthfulness one way or the other. Evidence of poverty has been held not 
to be relevant to motive to commit profit-oriented crime. The fact that an accused did 
not go to the police with a story he presents as a defence at trial may or may not be 
relevant to credibility.
It is commonly said that the determination of relevance 
depends on common sense and human experience.
“There is a principle—not so much a rule of evidence as a 
presupposition involved in the very conception of a rational 
system of evidence...which forbids receiving anything 
irrelevant, not logically probative. How are we to know what 
these forbidden things are? Not by any rule of law. The law 
furnishes no test of relevancy. For this it tacitly refers to logic 
and general experience.”15
How does one know whether one can draw an inference? Apart from cases on 
which the courts have already pronounced, and unless there is available empirical 
research, one needs to draw on common sense.
I mention the above quote from Thayer not because it advances my argument, 
but because of his Harvard connection with Ivan Rand. James B. Thayer (1831-1902) 
was a Harvard law professor, although he died before Rand took his law degree 
there. He was a leading evidence theorist who favoured an extension of judicial 
discretion and a simplification of the law of evidence. He is best known for the book 
from which this quote comes—A Prelim inary Treatise on Evidence a t the Common 
Law. John Henry Wigmore (1863-1943), a student of Thayer, and also a graduate of 
Harvard, built on his ideas, producing an eleven volume treatise, now titled Evidence 
in Trials a t Common Law. The work of Thayer and Wigmore is still influential in 
Canada. In particular, scholars interested in the drawing of inferences rely heavily on 
Wigmore’s work, although there has been feminist criticism of his ideas about sexual 
assault, such as the notion that complainants should be subjected to psychiatric 
examination. In other words, during his legal education, Ivan Rand breathed an air 
infused with enduring evidence scholarship, still being applied and criticized today.
15 James B. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law (Boston: Little Brown, 1898) 
at 264.
But does the law provide a test of relevance?
Canadian cases sometimes use the language of logic and the 
assessment of probabilities to provide such a test.
“To be logically relevant, an item of evidence does not have to 
firmly establish, on any standard, the truth or falsity of a fact 
in issue. The evidence must simply tend to “increase or 
diminish the probability of the existence of a fact in issue”...As 
a consequence, there is no minimum probative value required 
for evidence to be relevant.”16
However, the use of common sense requires some structure. Canadian case law 
occasionally refers to the determination of relevance through the logical assessment 
of probabilities, as illustrated in this quote from the Supreme Court of Canada 
decision in Arp.
It is not my purpose to engage in a discussion of theories of probability such as 
Bayes’s Theorem, but I think some general comments may illustrate the relegation of 
interesting, yet peripheral information to a footnote. Using the approach of assessing 
probabilities, to be relevant a piece of information does not have to make a material 
fact more probable than not, still less to prove it conclusively. Thus in order to hold 
that evidence of Band-Aids on the mirror is relevant to the issue of whether a person 
accused of being intoxicated actually was intoxicated, it does not have to be more 
probable than not that intoxicated people stick Band-Aids on mirrors. Perhaps only a 
very tiny proportion of intoxicated people stick Band-Aids on mirrors. It just needs 
to be more likely that Band-Aids will be stuck on mirrors if the accused were drunk 
than if he were not drunk.
“In a criminal trial, if a particular item of evidence is as likely 
to be found if the defendant is guilty as it is if he is innocent, 
the evidence is logically irrelevant on the issue of the 
defendant’s guilt.”17
Take the circumstantial evidence that an accused person had a motive to kill. It 
is clear that evidence that a person charged with murder took out an insurance policy 
on the deceased is relevant to whether he actually killed the deceased. In terms of 
probabilities, one does not have to think that having a motive to kill makes it more 
probable than not that one killed. However, it is a matter of common sense to think 
that someone with a motive is more likely to kill than someone without a motive. 
Evidence of motive is relevant evidence from which a negative inference of guilt 
may be drawn. It is not a determinative inference—it may in a particular case be a 
very weak inference indeed.
16 R . v. Arp, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 339 at para. 38.
17 Lempert, Gross & Liebman, supra note 15 at 231.
Because we don’t have research on the connection between motive and actually 
killing, we have to use our common sense. We also have to use our common sense to 
assess the strength of the inference. Do people with a motive to kill always, often, 
sometimes or rarely act on that motive?
1. Relevance—pose the comparison of probabilities question.
2. Examine common sense assumptions critically before 
slotting them into that question.
3. Address concerns about misuse via discretion to exclude 
prejudicial evidence or warnings.
In a world that is both legally tidy and critically engaged with the dangers of 
wrongful convictions and acquittals, this might be the structure we would use with 
respect to inferences. The law would require the assessment of probabilities in some 
sort of rational fashion. Because we lack certain information, fact finders should be 
very careful to critically examine the common sense assumptions they are making, 
both in terms of assessing relevance and deciding how strong or weak the inference 
is. In cases where there is real concern about unreasonable inferences being drawn or 
reasonable inferences being given too much weight, judicial warnings can be given 
or prejudicial evidence excluded altogether. But the world is not so tidy.
However, case law does not consistently state or apply a test of
the logical assessment of probabilities:
• Some cases contain language suggesting that if evidence is 
not conclusive it is not relevant at all, e.g. Shearing (“Why 
assume that a diary devoted to “mundane” entries would 
necessarily report on episodes of...abuse.”)18
• Reluctance to speculate, e.g. Portillo (shoes which may 
have made prints near the scene of a crime found near the 
accused’s apartment—too speculative)19
• Merger of policy considerations with relevance, e.g.
Turcotte (relevance analysis of accused’s failure to respond 
to police questions prior to detention mingled with right to 
silence analysis)20
Examples can be found where the courts use an approach other than the logical
18 (2002), 2 C.R. (6th) 213 (S.C.C.).
19 (2003), 17 C.R. (6th) 362 (Ont. C.A.).
20 (2005), 31 C.R. (6th) 197 (S.C.C.).
assessment of probabilities. For example, in the Supreme Court of Canada decision 
in Turcotte, the Court based its conclusion that a person’s non-response to police 
questions prior to him being a suspect was irrelevant more on his right to silence than 
an assessment of probabilities. One can even find cases where it appears to be 
thought that if evidence is not conclusive it is not relevant at all. I will return to this 
later.
At the moment, I am concerned that discussion of the legal test for relevance is 
not really appropriate for a lecture made up of footnotes, so I want to continue the 
discussion of reasonable inferences by turning to a particular judgment of Justice 
Rand.
A Case Study—R. v. MacDonald21
In this case, Justice Rand delivered a minority concurring judgment dismissing 
the appeal of Donald (known as Mickey) MacDonald from his conviction of robbery 
and kidnapping. Mickey MacDonald was represented by Miss Vera Parsons, KC, 
who was called to the Bar in 1924 and became Ontario’s first woman criminal 
defence lawyer.22 She is honoured through the Vera L. Parsons prize for Criminal 
Procedure in the Ontario Bar Admissions course.
How did Ivan Rand come to consider the case of Mickey MacDonald? Early in 
the morning of 13 December 1943 a truck containing thousands of dollars worth of 
liquor was seized by a gang of men, one of whom was armed with an automatic 
pistol. The driver of the truck, George Butcher, was forcibly confined in the car and 
the truck was taken to the bam of a riding school called The Lazy L. Ranch, about a 
mile south of Weston, near Toronto. (Weston is significant as the birthplace of 
Thomas H. Kemsley, later to become my husband.) An arrangement had been made 
with the owner of this riding school, James Shorting, to rent his bam to store “a few 
cases of Christmas liquor”. The plan to store the liquor did not go well; as the Court 
of Appeal judgment mentions that the heavily loaded truck fell through the floor of 
the bam and got stuck there. Apparently, Shorting later contacted the police to let 
them know the truck and liquor were in his bam.
George Butcher, the driver, was set free about 9.00 a.m. Later the same day, 
around lunch time, the police found the gang subsequently proved to have 
participated in the crime, at Mickey MacDonald’s apartment (as well as bootleggers). 
This led to the charges of robbery and kidnapping. At trial, Shorting and a stable boy 
identified Mickey as one of the people who unloaded the truck. Mickey claimed to 
have been somewhere else at the time—the gang had just shown up at his apartment 
and had not even mentioned the stolen liquor. His defence was unsuccessful and he 
was convicted.
21 [1947] S.C.R. 90.
22 Christopher Moore, The Ontario Legal Alphabet, online: Christopher Moore, Canadian Historian and 
writer <http://www.christophermoore.ca/legalalphabet.htm>.
The appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada had partly to do with whether the 
jury had been adequately warned that corroboration would be desirable with respect 
to the identification evidence of Shorting and the stable boy. These two may have 
been accomplices, and the law at that time required that the jury be warned of the 
danger of convicting on the basis of accomplice evidence in the absence of 
corroboration. This in turn led to the question of what could be corroboration. There 
were two facts that the Court thought could be evidence corroborating the 
identification of Mickey.
The inferences in MacDonald
1. A negative inference from association?
2. A negative inference from exculpatory lies?
The Court was unanimous in dismissing the appeal and finding that 
corroboration could be found both in the discovery of the gang in Mickey 
MacDonald’s apartment and in his improbable testimony about the lack of 
discussion of the stolen liquor.
“It was argued that the presence of these men, characterized 
by the circumstances indicated, was as consistent with 
innocence as with guilt; that either the gathering was mere 
coincidence or that the thieves might have made use of the 
apartment to arrange for disposing of the liquor without any 
previous knowledge on the part of the accused. Considering all 
of the evidence bearing upon it, including an adverse inference 
from disbelief in the improbable testimony of the accused, I am 
unable to treat the incident as being neutral in its probative 
effect; that a jury could find a balance of probability tending to 
connect him with the robbery seems to me to be perfectly 
clear...”23
This extract from Justice Rand’s decision shows he took the position that the 
gathering in the apartment soon after the crime and the accused’s improbable 
testimony were relevant pieces of information from which reasonable inferences of 
guilt could be drawn. The last sentence relates to the particular issue of corroboration 
in that the court took the position that for evidence to be corroborative it had to 
impress the jury on a level of probability—the inference needed to be strong. But my 
focus is on inferences in general, and inferences in general can vary in weight from 
weak to strong. “A brick is not a wall.”24 There may be a very large gap between 
evidence and proof.
23 [1947] S.C.R. 90, at 101, Rand J.
24 John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence, 5th ed. (Toronto: West Publishing, 1999) at §185.
I would like to examine each of the two inferences that caused Miss Vera 
Parsons to lose Mickey MacDonald’s appeal.
“the presence of these men”—guilt by association? Compare 
MacDonald with R.v. Ejiofor25
“There will be situations in which association with other drug 
dealers will be relevant to a fact in issue in the prosecution for 
the importation of narcotics....Crown counsel...conceded that 
evidence that Mr. [O] and Mr. [A] had been convicted of drug 
importation had no relevance...”
“[C]ounsel for the respondent properly described [the 
impugned] line of questioning as suggesting guilt by 
association. It offends one of the most fundamental principles 
of the criminal law. People can only be convicted for what they 
do, not for the company they keep.”26
What is often referred to as “guilt by association” is a current concern in the 
context of investigations of possible terrorist activity and detentions based on 
security certificates. My focus is on criminal trials, but on a general level there may 
be concern, especially among groups fearing discrimination, that negative inferences 
may be drawn from associates. Ejiofor illustrates what is a typical judicial antipathy 
to guilt by association reasoning. Such antipathy is also reflected in substantive 
criminal law since mere presence at the scene of a crime does not make one a party 
to it. Mr. Ejiofor himself was a refugee claimant from Nigeria charged with 
importing cocaine. Part of the Crown’s case was that within a few months of arriving 
in Canada, he became friends with three convicted drug importers. His evidence was 
that when he came to Canada, they were the three Africans that he met. “You know, 
when he [the first African he met] was talking to me it was as if I was talking to a 
brother of mine.”27
Nevertheless, association may sometimes be relevant evidence of guilt. Given 
the great harm that can result from unreasonable inferences in this context, it is 
particularly important to ask how we can distinguish reasonable from unreasonable 
inferences.
Was there a reasonable negative inference to be drawn from the presence of the 
gang and bootleggers at Mickey MacDonald’s apartment not long after the robbery? 
One may instinctively reject “birds of a feather flock together” reasoning, but part of 
the antipathy to guilt by association may be that the term is misleading. Justice Rand 
was not suggesting that Mickey MacDonald was guilty because he was associating 
with bad guys. The association was simply relevant information, which might be of
25 (2002) 5 C.R. (6th) 197 (Ont. C.A.).
26 Ibid. at paras. 7 and 8.
27 Ibid. at para. 4.
very little weight. But was the gathering even a brick in the wall of proof?
Mickey MacDonald was found in the company of the robbers a matter of hours 
after the robbery. Is that association more probable on the hypothesis of guilt or 
innocence? Was a guilty person more likely to be in their company a short time after 
the offence than an innocent person? We need to examine some plausible view of 
how the world works in order to test the “reality hypothesis”.2 Common sense 
suggests that a group of people together shortly after an exciting event is more likely 
to be made up of the group involved in the exciting event than a mixture of people 
involved and not-involved. There might be a reasonable inference that people who 
join me for dinner tonight are more likely to have been to this lecture than people 
innocent of that charge. One might think that a gang of robbers is more likely to split 
up than stay together, but that is not the point. They may be quite unlikely to stay 
together, but they still might be more likely to remain on their own than meet up with 
non-gang members, given the danger of a slip of the tongue disclosing their recent 
activity, or the danger of someone observing their behaviour and demeanour. On the 
other hand, for recent refugees to mix with people from their own country seems as 
consistent with the hypothesis of innocence as with guilt. The fact that the 
compatriots turn out to be criminals is not the basis of a reasonable inference at trial.
Reasoning through a particular inference, even using what feels like a logical 
approach to the assessment of probabilities, reveals how much guess-work is 
involved, and how care is needed to avoid generalizations along the lines of birds of 
a feather flock together. Nevertheless, I am inclined to think that the Supreme Court 
of Canada, including Justice Rand, was correct in finding that the gathering could be 
the basis for a reasonable inference that Mickey was guilty of something. I am not so 
sure how strong the inference could be with respect to robbery and kidnapping given 
the presence of bootleggers. The gathering was arguably neutral on whether Mickey 
was a robber or bootlegger.
“adverse inference from disbelief in the improbable testimony 
of the accused”
Is disbelieved testimony relevant to guilt?
What is chain of reasoning?
1. I do not (or the jury may not) believe the accused’s 
testimony. (Disbelief should not be based on an assumption of 
guilt)
2. The accused is lying.
3 .1 infer a sense of guilt from the fact that the accused lied.
4 .1 infer guilt from a sense of guilt.
Turning to the second inference, what about the “improbable” testimony that 
the robbers did not mention the liquor? This point invites reflection on how we draw 
inferences. I see three features to this second inference:
1. One cannot infer a lack of credibility on the basis of an 
assumption of guilt;
2. Inferential chains require particular scrutiny as they are 
only as strong as their weakest link—there is a danger that fact 
finders will leap to a negative inference based on one of the 
stronger links and neglect the weakest link;
3. There is a danger of circular reasoning in drawing an 
inference of guilt from disbelieved testimony.
Let’s look at the chain of reasoning. First, the disbelief in Mickey’s evidence 
that the gang did not mention the liquor is a common sense inference. If fact finders 
think that people who have just stolen liquor and are with people who could buy it 
from them would talk about it then they will be inclined to find evidence of silence 
improbable. I think the testimony that the robbers did not mention the liquor is 
logically relevant defence evidence as it’s more consistent with the hypothesis of 
innocence than guilt. My common sense tells me that robbers who have joined up 
with people not associated with the robbery are likely to be trying quite hard not to 
mention the robbery. Since I think the evidence is plausible, I don’t agree that it was 
capable of being corroborative evidence of guilt. I wonder if a jury that drew this 
inference would be assuming guilt in assessing credibility along the lines of doubting 
the evidence of accused persons because they have a motive to lie. As a matter of 
common sense, it is quite improbable that the gang would not have been discussing 
the robbery if only members of the gang were present.
However, I can also see that it is implausible that robbers would meet with 
buyers and also with innocent persons thus inhibiting discussion of a sale. Innocent 
people are less likely to be included in such a scenario than guilty people. It would 
be open to the jury to disbelieve the evidence of non-discussion and not count it as 
evidence of innocence.
The question would then become whether an inference of guilt can be drawn 
from lying? This involves two well-known steps—inferring a sense of guilt from 
lying and inferring guilt from a sense of guilt. The first step is weak since people lie 
for all sorts of reasons—an innocent person, for instance, might not wish to 
incriminate his guilty friends.29 The second inference is stronger. Thus the chain of
29 But lying may be seen as more consistent with guilt than with innocence. See R. v. Coutts (1998), 126 
C.C.C. (3d) 545 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 15, Doherty J.A. “This distinction between statements which are 
disbelieved and, therefore, rejected and those which can be found to be concocted and capable of
reasoning has been seen as quite dangerous. We are concerned about the jump from 
lying to guilt, fearing fact finders will make that leap too readily.
Lastly, we need to be alert for circular reasoning. Rand was addressing the 
question of whether lying could corroborate accomplice evidence. If an accomplice 
is disbelieved, then there is no need to look for corroboration. If the fact finder 
believes the accomplice, then he may look for corroboration. A fact finder cannot use 
belief in the accomplice testimony to disbelieve the accused and then count disbelief 
in the accused as corroborative of the accomplice. I think similar reasoning applies to 
use of disbelieved evidence to support identification.30
I am sure that both Mickey MacDonald and Vera Parsons would be interested 
to know that counting disbelieved evidence as independent evidence of guilt would 
be reversible error today. In the United Kingdom, juries must be given “Lucas” 
directions to look for independent evidence that the lie was a deliberate falsehood 
before it can be the basis of a negative inference.31 I am not aware of a particular 
name for the direction in Canada, but that is consistent with the Canadian 
requirement for independent evidence before an inference of guilt can be drawn, with 
respect both to statements outside court and in testimony.
Logic (fact positivists)32 v. Policy (feminists, criticial race 
theorists, etc.)
Part of the difficulty with the Mickey MacDonald inferences is how brief they 
are (albeit in a concurring judgment). It is not uncommon to find such brief 
conclusions on inferences and of course we do not see the jury process of examining 
potential inferences at all. Many errors can underlie inferences—errors of rationality, 
such as circular reasoning, or leaping too quickly through a chain of inferences, or 
errors of common sense, such as assumptions about the human behaviour of robbers, 
Nigerian refugee claimants, people who report crimes to police, and sexually active 
women. There may be errors of inclusion or exclusion of information as well as too 
much weight given to certain information.
How can we ensure that our inference drawing is first rate? Critics urging more 
attention to rationality could be called “fact positivists”, to use the terminology of 
University of Strathclyde evidence scholar Donald Nicolson. I picture the fact
providing circumstantial evidence of guilt cannot be justified as a pure matter of logic. In many, if not 
most cases, the inference of concoction flows logically from the disbelief of an accused’s statements or 
testimony.”
30 See R.v. Goodway (1994), 98 Cr. App. R. 11 (C.A.).
31 R.v. Lucas, [1981] 1 Q.B. 720 (C.A.). See P. Roberts & A. Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004) at 487.
32 Donald Nicolson, “Gender, Epistemology and Ethics: Feminist Perspectives on Evidence Theory” in 
Mary Childs & Louise Ellison, eds., Feminist Perspectives on Evidence (London: Cavendish 
Publishing, 2000) 13 at 16.
positivist as an evidence analyst with a broad interest in fact investigation and fact 
finding, a serious interest in probability theory, including in the mathematical 
representations of probabilities, who believes Canadian law has strayed off the firm 
ground of logic into the mushier yet dangerous ground of policy. From this 
perspective, our fact finding would become more first rate if we had a good grasp of 
probability theory, and avoided the temptation to mask policy as rationality. To 
overstate it somewhat, here policy may be seen as the enemy of rational fact finding. 
From such a positivist perspective, persons such as myself, who are critical of 
accepted inferences, are inhabitants of the realm of policy, or, even worse, of 
balancing the rights, for example, of rape victims against accused persons.
Other critics think our fact finding would improve if we paid more critical 
attention to our common sense assumptions. There may be fear in this camp that 
attention to a rational structure deflects attention from the common sense part of 
reasoning about inferences. Nicholson has argued that “fact positivism creates a form 
of closure that helps isolate the study and practice of fact finding from feminist 
challenge.” Plus, “formal logic tends to be adopted by those content with the 
premises involved in a reasoning process.”33 I am inclined to agree. There is 
something about the combination of the hard sense of logic (capable of being 
expressed in mathematical formulae) with soft common sense, and soft critiques of 
common sense, which tends to insulate established inferences from critical inquiry.
Being relegated to the realm of policy is even worse. Openly rejecting an 
inference on the grounds of policy rather than irrationality is not an attractive 
proposition. Policy has a second class ring as compared to logic. Who wants to argue 
for an irrational approach to fact determination? Or to argue against rectitude of 
decision when the fate of an innocent person or a future victim is at stake? O f course 
I am in favour of rigorous rationality in the interests of avoiding wrongful 
convictions and acquittals.
There we have the two worlds—one of focus on a logical structure of relevance determination 
and one of concern about discriminatory common sense both with respect to relevance and probative 
value. In the meantime, people are affected in very significant ways by fact finding in criminal trials. I 
want to start moving toward a conclusion by making the fairly obvious point that the drawing of 
inferences could be improved by attention to both. A focus on the logical structure of relevance 
determination needs to coexist with critical attention to common sense.
There is good reason for the current lack of clarity in the Canadian law on 
inferences. There is a real fear of “off the peg” reasoning, which may lead courts to 
put evidence that is relevant but of little probative value in the irrelevant category. 
People want to avoid stigmatizing individuals on the basis of generalizations or 
evidential hypotheses. However, assessing probabilities on the basis of common 
sense inevitably involves some level of generalization, as I hope I have illustrated. 
When we assess probabilities we cannot find facts on an individual basis. But 
generalizations are an uncomfortably close cousin of stereotypes. One often hears a 
refutation of a generalization on the point that it is not true of everyone in the group.
33 Ibid. at 18.
Of course it is not. The fact that everyone found in the company of criminals is not a 
criminal does not make being found in the company of criminal’s irrelevant 
information. But our fear of branding someone a criminal on that basis may make us 
prefer to reject that information rather than say that it provides a basis for a very 
weak inference. Relevance determinations may thus bear the burden of signaling a 
lack of confidence in assessing the weight of the inference.
Ironically, we may make errors in the other direction as well. A lack of 
attention to the steps in our reasoning might make us accept some inferences, such as 
guilt by association, too readily. I do not want to suggest that the only danger is over­
scrupulousness about dangerous inferences.
Roncarelli v. Duplessis34
“[AJction dictated by and according to the arbitrary likes, 
dislikes and irrelevant purposes of public officers acting 
beyond their duty would signalize the beginning of 
disintegration of the rule of law...”35
Can the rule of law be strengthened with respect to fact 
finding?
This quotation comes from Rand’s famous judgment applying the rule of law to 
administrative decisions, discussed by David Dyzenhaus in his 2004 Rand lecture.36
The realm of inferences is also one where the individual is exposed to the risk 
of arbitrary likes and dislikes, to the over and under estimation of relevance, flowing 
from errors of both logic and common sense. Persons at risk of wrongful conviction 
or persons victimized after acquittals of the guilty are, in a sense, at risk of even 
greater harm than Mr. Roncarelli. He was subjected to “vocational outlawry” when 
he lost the liquor licence for his restaurant; convicted persons are more literally 
declared to be outlaws. How can the law protect such people from the luck of the 
draw with respect to fact finders? Multiple fact finders in the form of juries may 
assist to some extent, but most criminal trials are by judge alone. Here we are 
dependant on law rather than multiple common senses to protect the individual and 
society from arbitrary fact finding.
My last footnote relates to the possibility that a more Rand-like approach 
focusing on the rule of law could offer some protection and combine the concerns 
about both rationality and common sense assumptions. Ideally, I would like the law 
on inferences to be susceptible to the form of doctrinal exposition at which Ivan 
Rand was expert.
34 [1959] S.C.R. 121.
35 Ibid. at 142, Rand J.
36 “The Deep Structure of Roncarelli v. Duplessis” (2004), 53 U.N.B.L.J. 111.
1. Overarching doctrine of judicial impartiality.
2. Legislation and case law governing particular inferences, 
e.g. Seaboyer,37 Turcotte, Noble38 (re accused not testifying)
3. More conscious, and transparent, attention to logic.
4. More conscious, and transparent, attention to the common 
sense assumptions used in the assessment of probabilities.
5. The recognition that sometimes information just does not 
help one way or the other, because of lack of knowledge or 
equally plausible inferences.
Indeed, there is quite a lot of law relating to the drawing of inferences. I think 
points one and two are pretty obvious and in a sense the easy part of subjecting 
inference drawing to the rule of law. It is not, however, the usual practice of 
Canadian lawyers and judges to spell out their assessment of the probabilities. David 
Dyzenhaus made the point that Roncarelli was fortunate in how transparent 
Duplessis was—there was a “record of unabashed govemment”.Justice Rand was 
fairly typical in his conclusory statements about the two pieces of evidence I have 
discussed. Actually working through his reasoning and setting it out as part of the 
duty to give reasons would assist the Roncarellis of arbitrary fact determination. That 
is even more critical with respect to the common sense assumptions slotted into both 
the assessment of probabilities and the estimate of weight. The law relating to 
reasons could therefore be enhanced to address concern about arbitrary inferences.
Lastly, it is recognized in the case law that information may be too equivocal to 
be of use—knowledge of the privilege against self-incrimination or post-offence 
flight can fall into this category. Hypotheses may simply be too speculative to be 
helpful to the fact finder.
The drawing of inferences is too important to be seen as somehow extra-legal, 
beyond the control of the rule of law. When deciding whether or not someone is a 
criminal, our inferences need to be first rate.
37 [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577.
38 [1997] 1 S.C.R. 874.
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